The 'holy grail', for a transdisciplinary educational neuroscience as I see it, would be to 24 empower learners through the volitional application of minds to consciously perceive and 25 alter their own brain processes into states more conducive to various aspects of learning.
26
(Campbell in Patten and Campbell 2011, pp. 8-9).
27
The question is not whether there are connections between minds and brains. There 2 See http://www.engrammetron.net/about.html (retrieved October 22 2013) "ENGRAMMETRON facilities enable simultaneous observation and acquisition of audio data from talking-aloud reflective protocols; video data of facial and bodily expression; and real-time screen capture. Instrumentation most notably supports: multi-channel electroencephalography (EEG); electrocardiography (EKG); electromyography (EMG); and eye-tracking (ET) capability. Orbiting this constellation of observational methods around computer enhanced learning platforms allows for unprecedented flexibility of educational research experimental design and delivery, and for subsequent data integration and analyses." 
98
In our laboratory, we conducted two studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging
99
(fMRI) and focused on the cognitive underpinnings of the two methods. . . . All participants 100 in our study were pretested for competency in the two methods: we selected only those who 101 were highly and similarly competent. Ensuring behavioural equivalence allowed us to infer 102 differences in neural activation in terms of processes involved in executing the two methods 103 rather than differences in task difficulty. Despite the lack of behavioural differences, we 104 found difference in the degree to which the two methods activated areas associated with 105 attentional and working memory processes. In particular, transforming word problems into 106 algebraic representation required greater access to attentional processes than did transfor-107 mation into models. Furthermore, symbolic algebra activated the caudate, which has been 
114
Another example is the research by Koizumi:
115
Although acquisition of a second language from early childhood is not undesirable, our 116 main concern is whether it has negative effects on the normal course of language develop-117 ment in one's native tongue. At present, there is no scientific data available on the 118 relationship between language acquisition (both the first and second) and brain maturation. 123 There are for example the cohort studies on language acquisition, brain develop-124 ment and language education (Hagiwara, Tokyo Metropolitan University). 125 Although their objectives to propose a guideline for second language learning and 126 education, especially for English, including the optimal ages and conditions sur-127 rounding it, is very interesting, they phrase this as 'a cognitive neuroscience-based 128 guideline'.
Bring Frameworks Together

130
In most of these papers it is argued that bringing together frameworks respectively 131 from educational research and from neuroscience will offer opportunities to deepen 132 our understanding:
133
The driving force behind bridging mathematics education and neuro-sciences in this project 134 is the prospect of combining knowledge from both research trajectories to contribute to Since the emergence of dispositions and basic emotions are to a large degree autonomic and 180 unconscious, they cannot be recognized nor stopped until they become conscious feelings. behaviour. Rather than representing a panacea to education, the cognitive neuroscientific 3 "Before the trials begin, the researcher fits a cap on the child's head with electrodes that register brain activity. This non-invasive EEG technique informs the researcher about the onset and duration of brain signals for particular stimuli and motor and perceptual responses. ANOVAs help determine differences in the brain activation and in the reaction times and additional analyses give more insight into the nature of interference and facilitation effects in the different experimental conditions." (Van Nes in Patten and Campbell 2011, p. 78) 4 Some authors remain nevertheless confident of such an approach: "With one research discipline set in a classroom environment and another that is based on a laboratory setting, the collaboration between the ME [Mathematics education component] and NS [Neurosciences component] research rests on studying the same children. The children who participate in the ME research are part of the larger pool of children who will also participate in the NAS research. In this way we hope to be able to compare children's phase of spatial structuring with the degree to which they automatically process quantities. 
360
What goes missing in any third-personal, physical description of brain states is, 361 Bakhurst (2008) argues, the subjective dimension: ". . .all that is observable are the 362 neural correlates of mental activity, not mental activity itself" (p. 422). To this he 363 adds that from a personalist position, beginning from the premise that the human 364 mind is a psychological unity, a person's mental states are not just a rag-bag 365 collection of representations. "One way to put this argument about psychological 366 unity is to say that brainism [the view (a) that an individual's mental life is 367 constituted by states, events and processes in her brain, and (b) that psychological 368 attributes may legitimately be ascribed to the brain, p. 415] struggles to make sense 369 of the first-person perspective. A person does not typically stand to her own mental 370 states as to objects of observation" (p. 422). Our observing is always charged with 371 agency: "But although a person does not relate to the contents of her mind as to 372 objects of observation, her relation to her own brain states, as revealed, say, by MRI 373 imaging, is one of observation. Thus what she observes when she observes events in 374 her own brain can only be brain events correlated with, and enabling of, her mental 375 life, not her mental life itself" (p. 423) To this personalism and following McDow-376 ell, he adds a distinctive view of human development: "As the child matures, 377 however, she undergoes a qualitative transformation. She enters a distinctively 378 human, essentially social form of life and acquires distinctively human 424 and yet the proponents do not stop to argue that a lot can be expected from such an 425 approach.
426
This is not to say that in some cases indeed relevant insights for education can be 427 offered. Here are two examples given in a study by Sigman, Peña, Goldin, Riberio:
428
Neuroscience research has developed signatures that may serve to diagnose cognitive Francis Schrag (2011)) offers a more subtle position when dealing with the 447 possible contribution of neuroscience. He too starts from the validity neuroscience 448 at first sight may have as it "discovers more and more about the mechanisms of 449 learning and memory" (pp. 222-223) but claims that "From the teachers' point of 450 view, knowing which brain structures are involved adds nothing to the success of 451 the strategies" (ibid., p. 226). He envisions that the ongoing research which is 452 offered by cognitive neuroscientists is ". . . yielding continued progress in under-453 standing neural processes at the micro level, an understanding that will be translated 454 into interventions designed to affect micro level processes in order to reduce 455 cognitive deficits and enhance performance at the macro level" (ibid., p. 236). 456 Strangely enough, he is not convinced that we need philosophers ". . .to tamp down 457 the enthusiasm of neuroscientists who may be all too ready to launch bandwagons declaring that their research will show the way to the holy grail of educational 
